Abstract-In this paper we present DRIVE, a distributed service-based system designed to facilitate an open economic market for federating Cloud providers. To address the challenges associated with market ownership and operation we propose the use of a cooperative (co-op) infrastructure in which the services that make up DRIVE are hosted across participants' resources. To prevent malicious behavior we use cryptographic, secure and privacy preserving allocation protocols as a means of establishing trust in the allocation infrastructure. We investigate through simulation the effect of different strategies, pricing functions, and penalty models on allocation performance and revenue, and show that the overhead of running DRIVE's services on commodity infrastructure is modest.
INTRODUCTION
T HE proliferation of cloud infrastructure, platform, and service providers, offers unparalleled flexibility at the expense of increased complexity. Cloud users are now faced with the daunting prospect of attempting to select a suitable provider from the many options available to them. For example, users may have access to commercial clouds (e.g., Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure), private clouds (e.g., those hosted by enterprise and institutions), open public clouds (e.g., Massachusetts Open Cloud), and research clouds (e.g., Jetstream [1] ). In many cases, users are most concerned with the cost of use, the capabilities provided, and the quality of service received; that is, they are less concerned with which provider satisfies their request. While not all providers are commercial entities (e.g., enterprise and institutional clouds), there is a direct or indirect cost model that underlies all providers, for example many clouds rely on advertizing, organizational, or external funding. Here, we advocate exposing these cost models via an open cloud market, in which consumers and providers can be matched based on tradeoffs between capabilities and cost.
In this paper we describe a cloud federation approach that enables requests to be allocated to, and over, any set of cloud providers. As such an approach may span multiple-potentially competitive-clouds, the most significant question is: who should own and operate such a federating infrastructure? No commercial organization would, or should, trust another provider (i.e., a competitor) to control such a critical component of their system. While a trusted third party could be used to host and maintain the infrastructure, this would incur additional costs, represent a potential loss of control of important functionality, and, the third party would need to be open to audit to demonstrate that its allocations were unbiased, without revealing commercially sensitive information.
To create an open market while also addressing the challenge of management ownership we propose a novel co-operative (co-op) infrastructure that is ownership and operator agnostic. The essential principle is that, the management infrastructure (composed of distributed services) is hosted on the cloud providers themselves. As there is obvious motivation for providers to subvert the allocation process to obtain unfair advantage, we use secure and privacy preserving allocation protocols within our architecture to ensure that allocations are conducted securely and fairly.
We have constructed Distributed Resource Infrastructure for a Virtual Economy (DRIVE) [2] , a service-based economic allocation system in which members of a federation collaboratively perform management and allocation operations by hosting core DRIVE services. Cloud providers participating in a federation, contribute services to DRIVE. These contributed services are in effect membership "shares" and are used for operations, for example allocation, advertising, agreement establishment, and so forth. DRIVE is economic protocol-and workload-agnostic, thus, it allows, for example, cloud services to be allocated using auction-based models or cloud infrastructure to be allocated using posted price models.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
We propose the concept of a co-op federation model in which resources contributed from cloud providers are used to provide core functionality. We explore the application of secure and privacy preserving auction protocols for resource allocation in this mutually competitive environment.
We present and evaluate an implementation of this model. This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we summarize related research. In Sections 3 and 4 we describe co-op and economic resource allocation models, respectively. In Section 5 we present the architecture and implementation of DRIVE. In Section 6 we evaluate economic performance and explore throughput and overhead when using contributed resources. Finally, in Section 7 we summarize our contributions.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Cloud federations have been proposed as a way to address availability issues by creating a reliable infrastructure across independent cloud providers, improve responsiveness and overall QoS by using globally distributed infrastructure, avoid lock-in to a single provider, and improve cost efficiency [3] , [4] , [5] . Generally, cloud federation approaches focus either on addressing execution or allocation federation. In the case of execution federation, researchers have focused on standardizing the type of requests that can be supported and developing generic resource fabrics that allow requests to be executed on "any" resource provider. In the case of allocation federation, systems aim to create common allocation frameworks, protocols, and languages that facilitate allocation of requests across providers. In this work we focus on allocation federation.
Cloud federation approaches typically rely on centralized allocation infrastructure, for example, InterCloud [6] uses a centralized Cloud Exchange for trading resources, Contrail [7] implements a central manager that maps requests to cloud resources using cost and performance scheduling, and STRA-TOS [8] leverages centralized or global schedulers (in STRA-TOS, a "CloudManager") to determine optimal allocation of users' requests across providers at runtime. Systems that use decentralized allocation models include Resources and Services Virtualization without Barriers (RESERVOIR) [9] and OPTIMIS [10] . Both use a peer-to-peer (P2P) model to enable direct communication between providers to negotiate realtime reservations. In some ways, P2P models are similar to DRIVE's co-op architecture, however P2P models rely on agreement algorithms and cannot support economic protocols. A thorough taxonomy of federation approaches is beyond the scope of this article, instead we direct readers to [3] .
The predominant pay-as-you-go models employed by cloud providers has necessitated the move towards computational economics as a primary means of federation. Economies are a favored model as they provide a way to reach agreement while representing the diverse perspectives of consumers and providers. Indeed, many economic protocols have been proposed and applied to computational resource allocation [11] . Auctions in particular have proven to be a popular protocol for computational economies as they facilitate multi-partite negotiation and are able to efficiently establish a market price. Examples, such as SORMA [12] , Nimrod/G [13] , Tycoon [14] , and Bellagio [15] , all provide support for auction based allocation. In a cloud computing context researchers have applied double-sided combinatorial auctions to allocate services [16] and virtual machines (VMs) [17] . These approaches are motivated by the need to provide more flexible and efficient marketplaces for cloud resources. In each case, is has been shown that auctions can improve utilization, and in some cases increase revenue [17] . Such approaches have also been shown to provide advantages with respect to providing differentiated service levels aligned with users' preferences [18] . Unlike DRIVE these existing systems do not support distributed, secure or privacy preserving auction protocols and therefore cannot be used securely in a co-op deployment.
The term "computing co-op" is often used to describe the sharing of unused computing resources between individuals, for example using Virtual Cloud concepts as a model for resource sharing [19] . However, to the best of our knowledge, the only example of a co-op model, in which scheduling components are hosted on contributed resources, is the Community Scheduler Framework (CSF) [20] . CSF is an open source framework for implementing meta-schedulers using a collection of Grid services: the Job Service provides an interface to create, submit and monitor jobs; the Queuing Service supports job submission to a queue which schedules jobs according to available (plug-in) scheduling policies; and Resource Manager Services (RMS) abstract provider differences. Although the architecture is distributed, there is no trust established between participants and the scheduler, therefore the system requires dedicated or trusted infrastructure to avoid compromise, and can not be used in a coop model. It supports only queue-based job scheduling and is incapable of implementing economic allocation protocols.
CO-OP RESOURCE ALLOCATION
As the number of participants (providers and consumers) increase, so to do the requirements on the allocation infrastructure to provide efficient and reliable allocations. Clearly, relying on a single provider to perform allocations is impractical as it may be unreliable and there is potential for subversion. Using an independent third party alleviates these risks, however infrastructure must be owned and operated by the third party. Often, third parties impose listing fees or transaction fees which are used to support the market (often called a self-sufficient market [21] ). Similar techniques are applied in electronic trading places such as eBay or Bitcoin exchanges.
Rather than hosting a dedicated infrastructure and implementing third-party or wholesale billing models we propose the use of a co-op architecture in which providers contribute computing resources to the federation for the purpose of allocation and other management operations. This approach has the advantage that the participantsthose that benefit from the federation-are also responsible for providing the infrastructure necessary to sustain the federation. The DRIVE co-op model is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Co-Op Trust Model
Due to the lack of infrastructural trust provided in a co-op deployment model, we define services according to a trust model composed of three categories: Participation, Obligation and Trusted Core. Participation services are required to interact with the market, for example the agents used by providers to trade resources and services. Obligation services are contributed by providers and collectively provide the core functionality of DRIVE, including (economic) resource allocation, service level agreement (SLA) negotiation, advertising, and other management tasks. Trusted core services are services which must be always available or which cannot be hosted by participating resource providers including, for example security, federation management, and authoritative discovery services (analogous to DNS root servers). The particular trust model used is implementation and deployment specific.
ECONOMIC RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Markets provide a mechanism for multi-partite exchange. They are also able to efficiently determine the price for a good (or service). There are a number of economic models that can (and have been) applied to distributed resource management; common examples include auctions, bargaining, commodity markets, posted price, and tendering [11] . Several "co-operative" economic models, in which consumers and providers work together to obtain an agreement, have also been proposed [11] ; for example, credit sharing, bid-based proportional sharing, and co-operative bartering.
We focus primarily on auctions as they have a number of desirable properties which make them attractive for use in a distributed environment. In particular, they are generally an efficient means of establishing a market price in an open market [22] and have been shown to provide Quality of Service (QoS) advantages over other methods [23] . Auctions are most often conducted from the perspective of the seller. That is, sellers auction goods and consumers place bids for these goods. In scenarios in which there are few consumers and many sellers this approach is efficient; however when there are few sellers and many consumers a reverse auction protocol (or a tender) can be more efficient. In a reverse auction protocol sellers bid (or tender) to provide a service to a consumer. While both approaches can be supported in DRIVE we focus primarily on the latter in this article as there are typically more consumers than providers in a federated cloud environment.
Secure Auction Protocols
Auction protocols require trust in the auctioneer to prevent a malicious activities, such as revealing bid information or manipulating the outcome of an auction. Developing trusted auctioneers often results in centralized system design, which in turn results in reduced protocol scalability and performance. The use of a centralized trusted auctioneer is therefore infeasible in a federated cloud model as it represents a single point of failure and limited scalability.
Secure and privacy preserving auction protocols [24] , [25] , [26] ensure that an auction cannot be subverted and that private pricing information is not disclosed. The most well known secure auction protocol is the Secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (SGVA) [24] . The SGVA protocol preserves bid privacy through a threshold bid-encryption technique. Valuations are hidden in the bid representation while still allowing winners (and the winning price) to be determined without revealing bid information. Homomorphic [25] or polynomial encryption [24] techniques can be applied to encrypt bids. In the homomorphic scheme, bid values are represented as bit vectors. Each bit is encrypted using a homomorphic cryptographic algorithm, such as Elgamel public key encryption [27] . Addition and comparison operators allow auctioneers to determine winners without revealing bid values. The comparison operation is a two step process which involves vector multiplication and then left to right decryption in order to discover the highest bid without revealing individual values of bids. The polynomial decryption scheme encodes bid values in the degree of a polynomial. A distributed pool of auction evaluators each calculates and publishes their "share" of the auction using dynamic programming techniques. Evaluators collaboratively discover the optimal value using a binary search. Values are then reconstructed by interpolating the shares published by each evaluator.
The Garbled Circuits [26] protocol takes a different approach in which bid values are encoded using a pregenerated boolean circuit. The circuit acts as a black box by evaluating a given input and revealing nothing except a single output, thus obscuring the original value and any intermediary values. The circuit is constructed from a series of boolean gates by an auction issuer. The circuit is then "garbled" by applying a random permutation to the wires (this permutation is kept secret). The garbled circuit is distributed to bidders so that they can each encode their bid values using the circuit. The permutation of wires is used to establish a mapping table, which maps the garbled output value to the real value. Upon completion of the auction the auctioneer executes the garbled circuit using the garbled input and decodes the output using the mapping table.
While secure auction protocols provide a mechanism for conducting resource allocation in a co-op environment they also place unique requirements on the allocation architecture as they require multiple distributed parties to work together to conduct an auction. The allocation architecture used in DRIVE to support these protocols is described in Section 5.3
Two Phase SLAs
A common criticism of economic negotiation is the potential for latency between participation and winner determination/confirmation. This latency may restrict participation in future negotiations due to lack of knowledge of the outcome of ongoing negotiations. Providers have two approaches to this issue: 1) they can reserve resources for the duration of the negotiation; or, 2) they can wait until the result of the allocation before reservation. Neither situation is ideal; initial reservation leads to underutilization as negotiation typically has one winner and multiple losers, while late reservation results in SLA violations as resource state may have changed between negotiation and reservation. To mitigate the effect of latency, DRIVE implements a progressive two phase SLA mechanism to reflect the various stages of negotiation. This two phase mechanism is explored in depth in [28] , however a brief summery follows.
The two phase SLA structure, in the context of the DRIVE allocation lifecycle, is shown in Fig. 2 . As the result of an allocation a tentative agreement is created between the user and winning provider(s) (phase 1). Before redemption, this agreement must be hardened into a binding SLA that defines particular levels of service to be delivered along with a set of rewards (and penalties) for honoring (or breaking) the agreement (phase 2). The tentative agreement is not strictly binding and penalties for violations are not as harsh as for breaking a binding SLA. The motivation for this separation is twofold, first it encourages providers to participate in negotiation in the knowledge they will not be penalized as harshly for withdrawing at an earlier stage; and, secondly, it facilitates overbooking which has been shown to increase revenue as some percentage of offers made will not result in allocations [29] .
DRIVE
DRIVE is designed as a collection of loosely coupled distributed web services. Consumers and providers communicate via web service APIs. Service providers are represented by DRIVE Agents-lightweight services hosted on providers' resources. These agents enable providers to trade resources (i.e., cloud instances) or services. The DRIVE market is designed to be open, therefore negotiations can take place using any pre-defined economic protocol. As the result of a negotiation an SLA-based agreement is created to represent the obligations of participants. Fig. 3 presents an overview of the major components within DRIVE.
DRIVE is based on a decentralized service-based model in which consumers are able to submit requests to an Allocation Manager (found via discovery services). The Allocation Manager is then responsible for coordinating the negotiation. In this article we focus on an auction-based implementation of an Allocation Manager, which we call an Auction Manager. The Auction Manager hosts an auction by implementing the preselected auction protocol and ensuring that communication between entities follows the rules of the auction. Providers may choose to bid for the right to satisfy a consumer's request via their representative DRIVE Agent. DRIVE currently implements three distributed auction protocols: a standard sealed-bid first-price auction, a sealed-bid second-price (Vickrey) auction and a privacy preserving, verifiable Garbled Circuit. A comparison between these protocols in DRIVE is presented in [30] .
Cloud federations face many of the same challenges seen in Grid Computing [31] , as resources and services span locations and administrative domains. Thus, DRIVE leverages common Grid approaches for federation management and participant registration and discovery. However, DRIVE is not dependent on Grid services, rather existing Grid services are reused, where possible, to avoid re-implementation. Our prototype implementation is Java-based and uses Globus Toolkit 4 WSRF Web services. However, the architecture could be implemented in any service-based model. DRIVE is designed to be provider and resource agnostic, for example, it can be used to allocate Virtual Machines in an Infrastructure-as-a-Service model or service requests in a Software-as-a-Service model. Thus, to support such a model DRIVE expresses requirements using a generic cloud request-an arbitrary unit that can be tailored for a specific cloud model. Cloud requests are described using the Job Submission Description Language (JSDL) [32] . DRIVE does not specify the format for a cloud request, however it is assumed that both consumers and providers are able to parse and understand a request. For example, common cloud terminology (e.g., vCPUs, Memory, Storage, I/O, etc.) or agreed upon description languages could be used. SLAs are described using WS-Agreement with JSDL used as the term language. Both JSDL and WS-Agreement are suitably flexible and extensible to support arbitrary cloud requests. The bidding policy framework is implemented using the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [33] .
In the remainder of this section we describe the auctionbased DRIVE implementation with specific focus on the deployment and trust model, registration and discovery, auction-based resource allocation, SLA management, and provider participation in the market. Fig. 4 illustrates a DRIVE deployment for auction-based allocation. In this figure five service providers (SPs) are existing members of the federation. Each SP exposes a set of services that facilitate resource discovery, allocation, contract negotiation, and cloud request delivery within the federation. Each service is categorized according to the layered trust model described in Section 3.1. SP3 and SP4 are shown offering only participation services, SP1 and SP2 offer only obligation services, and SP5 reflects a typical provider hosting a combination of participation and obligation services. The registration and discovery services are hosted in a trusted environment. SP1, SP2, SP3 and SP4 show a simple negotiation. In this example DRIVE Agents acting on behalf of SP3 and SP4 are negotiating for the rights to host a cloud request submitted by a user through a DRIVE Broker (a simple client that abstracts DRIVE market APIs), negotiation takes place using a contributed Auction Manager hosted on SP2 and Auction Component hosted on SP1.
DRIVE Deployment and Trust Model

Participation Services
Participation services are required to interact with DRIVE. For example, DRIVE Agents represent providers in economic negotiation by exposing standard DRIVE interfaces for receiving advertisements, discovering auctions, bidding, and creating SLAs. DRIVE Agents respond to auction events by computing bids for cloud requests they wish to host using valuation functions and local policies. They are also responsible for following the negotiation protocol and encoding bids in the appropriate bidding language. Providers may optionally utilize a DRIVE Reservation service to store future commitments such as current negotiations, tentative agreements, and hardened SLAs. This service is the key component for supporting flexible advanced reservations in DRIVE and is leveraged by some bidding policies. DRIVE abstracts access to the specific provider's provisioning system via an Execution Service. In the case of cloud providers the DRIVE execution service simply translates requests into the respective cloud API (e.g., Amazon EC2 APIs).
Obligation Services
Obligation services collectively form the core of DRIVE and provide functionality such as resource allocation and SLA management. The Auction Manager, Auction Context, Auction Component, Contract Manager (for managing SLAs), and Publishing Service (PS) are implemented as obligation services. The auction and contract services are responsible for conducting auctions and creating SLAs on behalf of users. Publishing Services are used to publish auction advertisements and results to the federation. Publishing Services enable reverse auction discovery. This allows bidders to discover auctions that were not directly advertised to them. Auction results are also published to share market information with bidders and provide a public record of results. Results may be monitored by any entity in the system and can be used for verifying allocation results.
Trusted Core Services
Some DRIVE services require a level of trust that cannot easily be provided on untrusted infrastructure. For example, services may require data privacy, data integrity, certificate chains for authorization, or a trust anchor. DRIVE defines a trusted core as the smallest subset of services which require these levels of security. In the DRIVE implementation, registration and discovery services are hosted in the trusted core as functionality would be severely limited if these services were unavailable. Authentication and authorization services must also be hosted in the trusted core. DRIVE relies on the Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS) [34] , a database-based membership service, to manage user and provider authorization information across multi-participant federations.
Registration, Advertisement and Discovery
The decentralized nature of DRIVE necessitates multiple levels of discovery. For example, consumer discovery of Auction Managers, DRIVE service discovery of other DRIVE services involved in a particular process (e.g., allocation), and DRIVE service discovery of providers. To address these requirements all providers must register themselves and their services upon joining the federation. The information that is registered is: 1) Metadata describing high-level capabilities of the provider in a resource profile [2] . 2) Addresses of participation services so that bids can be submitted and SLAs can be created and redeemed. 3) Addresses of obligation services that can be used by DRIVE. Unlike traditional cloud and grid computing models, provider discovery is not the basis for matchmaking in DRIVE. Instead, the metadata registered for each provider acts as a "hint" that provides a partial picture of the system from which Auction Managers can target potentially compatible providers. Reverse discovery via Publishing Services complements this model by enabling providers to discover auctions. The use of a hint based discovery mechanism helps to improve allocation efficiency at the expense of absolute knowledge. Discovery in DRIVE is therefore loss tolerant in that any number of satisfactory resources can be discovered to form a partial view of the system. This approach also ensures all entities have the opportunity to participate in negotiations even if their capabilities are not perfectly aligned with a given cloud request. The DRIVE prototype makes use of the Globus Monitoring and Discovery System (MDS) [35] as a general purpose registration system.
Auction-Based Resource Allocation
The services used to conduct auction-based allocations are shown in Fig. 5 . The Auction Manager (AM) is the central component of the system. It creates new auctions, oversees the bidding process, monitors the status of auctions and determines the result. A unique Auction Context (ACx) is associated with each AM and is responsible for storing general allocation and protocol state (auction description, options, protocol properties, encrypted bids). An Auction Component (AC) is a general purpose service which implements arbitrary auction protocol specific functionality using a plug-in model and message passing interface.
The AM is responsible for managing the auction process. It instantiates new auctions by parsing cloud requests. The request can include restrictions on the auction protocol as well as other auction configuration, such as auction closing conditions, and protocol specific properties, such as encryption size for the Homomorphic SGVA. DRIVE supports different auction protocols via a plug-in interface. The AM dynamically loads these protocols to conduct an auction. All plug in protocols must implement the Java protocol interface and must be prepackaged with the AM. The AM has an advertisement thread pool which, through a standard interface, can be used by the auction protocol plug-in to find and advertise the auction to bidders. Suitable bidders are found by composing a simple MDS query for providers which meet certain requirements related to the request description (currently this selection is based only on the type of request, e.g., storage or VM request). Advertisements include the cloud request, auction protocol configuration, and the contact address of the AM. The AM exposes a bid submission interface to facilitate bidding and result retrieval. The AM also includes a multi-threaded Auction Monitor that ensures running auctions follow specified auction configuration, such as ensuring that the auction closes when its end conditions are met (e.g., end time).
The AM uses an associated Auction Context to store and manage state for a particular auction, exposing much of the lifecycle of an auction. State is represented in a WSRF ResourceProperty, accessible only to entities within the system. In non-WSRF services, the ACx could be implemented using a database. When an auction is created the AM will create a new resource in its ACx. The Auction Monitor will update auction state throughout the auction process. For example, in a sealed bid protocol the ACx resource will store sealed bids allowing for determination of the winner at the conclusion of the auction.
Auction Components provide service-based wrappers for protocol specific functionality. The AM may instantiate one or more ACs as required for a given protocol. For example, in the Garbled Circuit protocol an AC will be instantiated as an Auction Issuer, for the homomorphic and polynomial SGVA auction protocols a group of ACs will be instantiated as Auction Evaluators. All ACs load a registered plug-in protocol library and create a stateful representation of the auction. ACs provide a generic message passing interface that enables protocol specific messages to be passed between ACs and the AM. A protocol and instance id is attached to each message to ensure that messages are routed to the appropriate protocol plug-in and with the appropriate context. Message contents are not parsed by the AC itself, rather the plug-in components in both the AM and AC parse the message and perform an appropriate action. A response can be sent in the form of a synchronous message returned through the AC service or more commonly through an asynchronous message. The protocol plug-in also has access to the auction resource controlled by the ACx. This resource allows the protocol plugin to store and retrieve global auction state using a stack based approach. The interface implemented by all protocol plug-ins defines the required instantiation, deletion, message passing, state management, and resource access methods. The AC serves to provide protocol independence and extensibility enabling development of distributed auction protocols without worrying about the communication interface or distributed services required. Fig. 6 outlines the auction based allocation process. Before starting an auction the user or client must authenticate (VOMS). The client selects a viable AM by discovering available AMs (MDS). The choice of AM is left up to the client. Having selected a suitable AM an auction request is submitted to start the auction. The AM creates an instance of the auction, creating stateful resources to maintain auction state through the ACx. Depending on the auction protocol one or more ACs will be instantiated and used to perform protocol specific actions.
Auction Scenario
The AM advertises the auction and solicits bids from providers. The AM retrieves a list of suitable providers from MDS, filtered based on specific requirements derived from the cloud request. Selected providers are then notified of the auction through "push" advertisements. The auction is also published to available PSs for reverse discovery. Providers' DRIVE Agents compute their bids based on local policies and pricing functions, they then submit their bid to the AM at any time before the auction closes.
Throughout the auction the AM manages constraints and closes the auction when end conditions are met. When the auction is complete, a winner is determined and a tentative agreement is created. The AM notifies participants of the result and publishes results to one or more PSs.
SLA Creation
At the conclusion of an auction the Contract Manager (CM) negotiates SLAs with the consumer and winning provider (s). A provider may reject an agreement for any number of reasons (lack of capacity, consumer reputation, etc.). If an agreement is rejected, the CM may, if the auction protocol permits, request substitute providers from the AM. Substitute providers are found by recomputing the auction result by excluding the previous winner. Substitute providers can reduce auction latency and overhead as another auction need not be executed; however, penalties may be applied to the defaulting provider to ensure that consumers are not penalized. Fig. 7 shows the interactions between DRIVE services when creating an SLA. In this case the protocol allows substitute providers to be used. At the completion of an auction, all participating entities are notified of the result. The same results are also published to PSs. Any of the participating entities can initiate the SLA creation process after the auction concludes. The CM begins by obtaining the auction result from the AM, this result is used to create one or more SLAs containing the cloud request, participating parties, price, rewards and penalties specified. An SLA resource is created to represent the SLA for the duration of the provision. The CM then iteratively attempts to confirm SLAs with each of the winning bidders. If all DRIVE Agents (DAs) confirm the SLA(s) all parties are notified of the completed SLA(s) and the client is able to redeem their cloud request with the winning providers. In the case that one or more DAs reject the SLA the winning DA returns a signed rejection message to the CM indicating it cannot confirm the requested agreement. The CM passes the signed message to the hosting AM to determine if substitute providers can be computed. If so, the AM recomputes the winner by excluding the defaulting provider from the auction and returns the new auction result to the CM. The SLA hardening process is restarted by contacting the new winner for confirmation. Depending on defined policies the defaulting party may incur a penalty.
Provider Participation in the Market
Providers use a DRIVE Agent (DA) to perform registration, DRIVE service discovery, economic negotiation, and SLA management. Like the AM, the DA implements a plug-in protocol model to support different economic protocols. The DA implements standard DRIVE interfaces, for example to receive and respond to allocation advertisements or negotiation requests. It also provides mechanisms to monitor and update service capacity, determine with whom to negotiate (e.g., based on reputation), and calculate appropriate valuations based on requests and available capacity. All messages and bids are signed by the DA. In the case of sealed bid auctions bids are encrypted using the AM's public key.
One of the most difficult challenges in economic negotiation is determining when to participate in a negotiation and how to value resources and requests. In a reverse auction protocol this decision making process is performed by the provider. The provider must consider if it can bid on an auction by assessing the cloud request and current capacity, ensuring the economic protocol is supported, and finally valuing the request. To address these complex decisions the DA includes an XACML-based policy engine. Currently DRIVE supports policies regarding provider capacity and future commitments, this allows current and projected to be used to determine capacity and contribute to the assessment of risk.
The DA uses pricing functions to determine a base price for a cloud request. Pricing functions define how different metrics are combined to determine the value of a good. Pricing in distributed computing markets is complicated by the lack of standardization, for example providers have different resource representations and there are no well defined "units". Cloud IaaS providers have made some progress standardizing computational units with the introduction of VMs, however these units differ between providers. Rather than attempt to solve these issues directly, the DA provides an interface that enables providers to implement their own pricing function based on the cloud request. Providers may choose to include any metrics in their prices. For example, the prototype pricing functions described in Section 6.3.3 consider physical resources such as number of VMs, CPUs, Memory.
EVALUATION
Our evaluation investigates the feasibility of employing a co-op model by analyzing the overhead of running DRIVE services on contributed resources and studying auction throughput with many providers. We also explore an economic allocation scenario looking specifically at the effect of various pricing and penalty functions in a deployed DRIVE system.
Unless otherwise stated the following experiments are hosted on a virtualized testbed distributed over 10 PCs connected by a gigabit Ethernet network. The PCs each have Core 2 Duo 3.0 GHz processors with 4 GB of RAM. In each experiment a single AM and CM are run on separate hosts with each allocated 1 GB of memory. We configure a variable number of providers on the remaining 8 PCs and allocate 512 MB of memory to each provider.
Co-Op Service Overhead
To study the overhead of hosting DRIVE services we monitor each service individually to determine the CPU, Memory and Input/Output (I/O) usage. Only the core services required to conduct auctions and create SLAs are considered in this analysis. The Auction Component is not considered as its functionality is protocol specific and the Publishing Service has not been included as it is not required to conduct an auction.
Each of the services analyzed is hosted on a dedicated host so as to minimize competition for resources. 20 DRIVE Agents (DAs) are deployed over the remaining hosts to simulate the requirements of a realistic auction scenario. Each DA implements a random bidding policy. Auctions have a duration of 30 seconds and substitute providers are enabled. We have constructed a simple test workload that submits a group of auction requests over a 30 second period, increasing from 5 to 50 requests in increments of five requests, every minute (275 total requests). Thus simulating an increasing number of concurrent consumers. To ensure that second chance providers are used each cloud request consumes the entire capacity of a single provider.
Figs. 8a and 8b shows the CPU usage and I/O usage of each service, respectively. Only a single DA is shown as all DAs exhibit similar usage. I/O includes all data transferred between the service and any other service. The measured I/O is the total bytes read and written per second. In general, the I/O usage follows the CPU usage for each service, this is due to the fact that almost all service functionality involves communicating with other services (e.g., conducting auctions and creating SLAs). Both figures show an increase in peak usage and duration for each service as the number of cloud requests submitted increases. The order in which services are invoked is clearly visible in both figures: as requests are submitted the AM peaks, which in turn generates work for MDS (to discover bidders) and the DA (computing a bid), after the auction period of 30 seconds has elapsed the AM computes a winner and the CM creates an SLA. As the CM is operating there is often an additional peak in the AM due to result retrieval and, for larger numbers of auctions, the computation of substitute providers. Fig. 8a shows that the AM and CM consume the most CPU of the services examined. Creating and advertising auctions, as well as soliciting bids, consumes the most CPU for these services. Winner determination and substitute computation in this workload are small due to the fact that a simple protocol is selected and few bidders participate in the auction. The amount of CPU consumed by SLA creation is exaggerated due to the saturated test workload-there are significantly more cloud requests than capacity available in the federation-this results in many providers bidding on auctions they cannot satisfy and the CM iteratively attempting to confirm SLAs with all potential substitute providers for each request.
MDS CPU usage is low, as it is only used to discover registered bidders. The figure also shows increased MDS CPU usage at approximately 9 minutes. This is due to the DA being configured to periodically register updated metadata every 10 minutes. The DA computation is minimal with a maximum of 16.2percent CPU usage. This is because DAs are configured to use random bidding policies irrespective of the current load. Using complex valuation functions and bidding policies would increase expected CPU usage. The duration of DA CPU usage increases as the number of auctions increases, this is due both to bid computation and SLA confirmation (with increased number of substitutes). The memory usage of each service is shown in Fig. 8c . Neither MDS or the DA exceed their initial allocation with maximum memory usage of approximately 50 MB. This is because the DA stores no state directly and MDS only stores metadata for registered DAs. Both the AM and CM show increased memory usage with the number of requests submitted, due to the auction and SLA state stored by each service. Memory usage does not decrease, as would normally be the case, because the configurable resource lifetimes [36] used for auction and contract resources are (by default) set to one hour.
These results illustrate the value and viability of the coop model. The AM and CM exhibit short periods of high CPU when many requests are submitted simultaneously; however, both are able to satisfy 25 simultaneous auctions (concurrent consumers) using less than half a CPU core. Further, memory usage, even after hosting 275 auctions and storing state in memory, is approximately 100 MB for each service. Providers therefore can contribute relatively modest resources and still satisfy the requirements of hosting hundreds or thousands of auctions per minute. Fig. 9 shows the throughput (requests per minute) for an increasing number of DAs (cloud providers) using targeted advertisements and reverse discovery. Throughput is calculated based on the total time to allocate 5,000 cloud requests. The time is measured client side and includes the time to submit each request, conduct an auction, negotiate the resulting SLA with the winning provider, and return the SLA to the client. To simulate a realistic auction scenario a sealed bid second price auction protocol is used. Auctions conclude when every provider has bid on the auction. To examine the throughput using reverse discovery, bidders are configured to poll a random PS periodically at a random interval between one and five seconds. The AM is configured to publish every auction to all PSs. The goal of these experiments is to evaluate the throughput of the DRIVE auction services.
Throughput
To ensure that bids are submitted as frequently as possible, DAs are configured to use a random bidding policy irrespective of request requirements or available capacity.
Throughput, when using direct advertising, decreases rapidly with the number of bidders (providers). This is because the AM becomes saturated due to the requirement to advertise to every registered bidder. When using PSs, the decrease in throughput with increased bidders is not as significant as the AM must only contact up to four PSs per auction. Interestingly throughput is highest when only a single PS is used, this is because the PSs are able to serve many concurrent requests quickly (in comparison to conducting an auction) and the burden on the AM is lower when only publishing to a single PS. The advantage of publishing over advertising is evident as advertisements are no longer sent to every potential bidder. A single PS with 50 bidders results in a 300 percent increase in throughput when compared to direct advertising.
Resource Allocation
To explore the allocation performance of DRIVE we use three allocation strategies [28] :
Guaranteed (G): The baseline strategy in which providers bid based on potential utilization. That is, they never bid beyond their capacity. As bids are a guarantee, providers cannot reject a resulting SLA and therefore there are no opportunities to use substitute providers. Overbooking (O): Providers bid based on their actual utilization (irrespective of any outstanding bids). As providers can bid beyond capacity they may choose to accept or reject SLAs depending on capacity at the time of SLA negotiation. No substitute providers are used. Substitutes (S): Providers bid based on their actual utilization. Losing providers may be substituted with another provider during SLA negotiation if the winning provider does not have sufficient capacity.
Experimental Workload
As the basis of evaluation we use three synthetic workloads [28] , [37] that are designed to simulate different cloud-like workloads. These workloads are designed to represent a worst case scenario for auction performance: SaaS usage, in which requests are characterized by short duration, ad hoc, and interactive usage. The synthetic workloads were created by sampling a traditional batch workload and decreasing the ratio of request duration to arrival rate. The three synthetic workloads (low utilization, medium utilization, and high utilization) aim to represent varying degrees of load. The workloads are summarized in Table 1 . Each Fig. 9 . DRIVE throughput using direct advertising and publishing services. The throughput is inclusive of auction and SLA creation. workload contains between 2,111 and 11,014 requests, with each spread over almost 9 hours. The average request run time for each workload is approximately 59 seconds with average CPU utilization of 93-94 percent. The workloads aim to represent increasing overall utilization and are based on the utilization limit of the testbed (20 providers).
Allocation Fairness
Fig . 10 shows the number of cloud requests allocated to each host in the system using each strategy and synthetic workload. The hosts have been arbitrarily ordered to visualize the data. In each experiment, requests from the workload trace are submitted to DRIVE for allocation. DRIVE conducts a Vickrey auction for each request and allows each provider to bid. Each provider implements a random bidding strategy. At the conclusion of the auction the AM determines the winner and attempts to create an SLA with the winning provider. Fig. 10 shows the advantage to individual providers of bidding beyond capacity and also using substitute providers. In both the medium and high workloads the advantages between each strategy is seen for every provider. Due to the small number of requests submitted in the low workload the difference between strategies is less clear. The na€ ıve overbidding strategy results in unallocated workload and lower utilization. On average, 16, 77, and 315 SLAs per provider cannot be hardened in the low, medium, and high workloads respectively. This approach results in significant underutilization across the federation as a whole [28] . As expected, the requests are evenly distributed across the providers in each workload due to the random valuation policies used. The high workload shows the most even distribution due to the increased sample size.
Economic Performance
To explore the economic performance of different strategies and market conditions we have implemented several pricing functions that utilize local information to determine bid prices. The pricing functions are described in terms of a unit price, where units represent the "size" of a request and units may be expressed in terms of computational requirements or time, as is typical of cloud requests. The pricing functions are:
Random: the unit price is determined irrespective of any other factors.
Constant: the unit price is the same for every request. Available Capacity: the unit price is proportional to the inverse projected provider capacity at the time when the request would execute. Win/Loss Ratio: the unit price is proportional to the ratio of winning to losing bids seen by the individual provider. Time Based: the unit price is proportional to the time since the provider last won an auction. The Random and Constant pricing functions are baseline functions. The other pricing functions attempt to simulate some aspect of a dynamic supply and demand model. In these functions prices are adjusted dynamically to reflect the projected capacity of the provider or to factor in previous successes. Fig. 11 shows the allocation rate for each pricing function and allocation strategy. As shown above, the overall allocation rate increases when providers overbid and substitute providers are used, irrespective of the pricing function. When using guaranteed and substitute strategies there is little difference between the allocation rate of each pricing function as all bids are guaranteed or can be substituted across providers. However, when overbidding without substitutes the time and win/loss based strategies exhibit lower allocation rates for both workloads. This is because prices are determined entirely based on historical state and therefore the lowest bidder will continue to be the lowest bidder for all concurrent auctions until an SLA is created.
Total provider revenue for the different strategies and pricing function are shown in Fig. 12 . The use of overbidding and substitute provider strategies provides significant additional revenue over the guaranteed strategy for each pricing function, this increase is in line with the increased allocation rate shown in Fig. 11 . Again the strategies without substitutes exhibit lower revenue for the time based pricing functions. This is due both to lower allocation rate and also the follow on effect from the poor allocation rate-prices are kept artificially low as providers continue to lower prices over time. The random pricing function produces very low revenue due to the likelihood of at least one bidder computing a low bid. Constant pricing is essentially a price fixing model in which providers collude. In a competitive environment it may be advantageous for a provider to break the agreement as there is no means of enforcing collusion. Available capacity pricing attempts to represent risk to providers, however as most requests use almost 100 percent capacity this function generates almost maximum revenue. This function would be most suitable when using large scale providers that can simultaneously host many "average" requests. Win/loss-and time-based pricing are shown to be the most sensitive to the different strategies. The time based function is particularly inflexible due to the static declaration of a time period.
Economic Performance with Penalties
To avoid malicious bidding strategies DRIVE supports the definition and enforcement of penalty functions that can be applied to providers who fail to meet contractual obligations. The two phase SLA model supports two levels of penalties, first at the SLA creation stage and second at the SLA hardening stage. In this section we consider the former; specifically we investigate potential penalties that can be applied to providers who, after winning an auction, fail to agree on an SLA. We focus only on the substitute provider strategy as it allows penalties to be imposed while still satisfying the request (using a substitute provider).
The penalty functions considered are: Constant (C): A fixed penalty irrespective of the request or bid (200 "credits"). Request Units (RU): Calculated based on the number of requested "units" (1 "credit" per unit). Win Price (WP): Proportional to the winning provider's bid (pre-substitute). Substitute Price (SP): Proportional to the price of the substitute provider's bid (pre-substitutes). Bid Difference (BD): The difference between the original winning provider's bid and the substitute provider's bid. Fig. 13 show the total federation revenue for each pricing function when each penalty function is applied. It also shows the baseline revenue when no penalties (NP) are applied. These figures show the total federation revenue and do not illustrate the effect on individual providers. In practice penalties may be applied to one or more providers and the value of these penalties may be materialized as a discount to the consumer or to the federation. The figures show that enforcing a complete penalty equal to the bid price (WP or SP) results in a significant reduction in revenue-approximately 50 percent of the NP revenue. Due to the na€ ıve pricing functions used, the difference between WP and SP is minimal for all but the time and random pricing strategies. RU and C closely model NP as they are proportional to the actual revenue. Perhaps the fairest penalty is BD as it only penalizes the additional cost incurred, however due to the small difference between WP and SP, this penalty results in revenue approximately equal to NP for most pricing functions.
SUMMARY
One of the biggest challenges facing cloud federations is the ability to efficiently allocate requests across cloud providers. The economic models employed by many cloud providers has re-motivated the need for new economic approaches to distributed resource allocation. However, the commercial nature of cloud federations raises important questions regarding management and allocation, such as who should host the federation's management infrastructure? and how can allocations be conducted securely and fairly? We proposed tackling these problems by using a novel co-op model in which participants contribute resources to collectively provide the federation's management infrastructure.
To address the challenge of providing trustworthy allocations on potentially untrusted hosts we leverage secure and privacy preserving economic allocation protocols. While secure allocation protocols are known to incur overhead, we have shown that DRIVE services exhibit only modest overhead when hosted on commodity hardware Thus, we believe the advantages of a co-op model outweigh the potential cost to participating providers. In federated cloud environments it is clear that both consumers and providers will need to adopt sophisticated strategies in order to maximize system utilization and revenue. We showed that providers can benefit by using simple strategies such as overbooking, two-phase contracts, and enabling substitute providers to be used when providers are unable to meet contractual obligations.
